Former Women's World Champion, Jenny Clarke, discusses sound methods of practicing. One sinister clue that might lead the way is the sound of two previous students. It would provide a way to justify causal beliefs despite the fact that said beliefs appear to be without rational grounds. It accomplishes the latter by emphasizing what the argument concludes, namely that inductive reasoning is groundless, that there is no rational basis for inductive inference. While it may be true that Hume is trying to explicate the content of the idea of causation by tracing its constituent impressions, this does not guarantee that there is a coherent idea, especially when Hume makes occasional claims that we have no idea of power, and so forth. They only claim that we have no clear and distinct idea of power, or that what is clearly and distinctly conceived is merely constant conjunction. First, the realist interpretation will hold that claims in which Hume states that we have no idea of power, and so forth, are claims about conceiving of causation.

Let us now consider the impact that adopting these naturally formed beliefs would have on Hume’s causal theory. Nidditch. Hence, citations will often be given with an SBN page number (now called ISBN). Turn the page to read about the college dorm with haunted hidden passageways. The general proposal is that we can and do have two different levels of clarity when contemplating a particular notion. But by mounting an object to the center of the system, you can make sure the object can face any particular direction at any time. When setting up a game of billiards, the first step is to rack the balls in the triangular rack, with the 1-ball at the top and the 8-ball in the center. Rickie Fowler hits out of the rough off the first fairway during the first round of the 80th Masters Golf Tournament at the Augusta National Golf Club. The first team to hit its target twice wins. If he breaks through, he can go back to his team. The second step of the causal realist interpretation will be to then insist that we can at least suppose (in the technical sense) a genuine cause, even if the notion is opaque, that is, to insist that mere suppositions are fit for doxastic assent.

Clatterbaugh takes an even stronger position than Blackburn, positing that for Hume to talk of efficacious secret powers would be literally to talk nonsense, and would force us to disregard Hume’s own epistemic framework, (Clatterbaugh 1999: 204) while Ott similarly argues that the inability to give content to causal terms means Hume cannot meaningfully affirm or deny causation. The challenge seems to amount to this: Even if the previous distinction is correct, and Hume is talking about what we can know but not necessarily what is, the causal realist holds that substantive causal connections exist beyond constant conjunction. Even granting that Hume not only acknowledges this second distinction but genuinely believes that we can suppose a metaphysically robust notion of causal necessity, the realist still has this difficulty. Even granting that Hume has a non-rational mechanism at work and that we arrive at causal beliefs via this mechanism does not imply that Hume himself believes in robust causal powers, or that it is appropriate to do so. Kemp Smith argues for something stronger, that this non-rational mechanism itself implies causal realism. After engaging the non-rational belief mechanism responsible for our belief in body, he goes on to argue, "Belief in causal action is, Hume argues, equally natural and indispensable; and he freely recognizes the existence of ‘secret’ causes, acting independently of experience." (Kemp Smith 2005: 88) He connects these causal beliefs to the unknown causes that Hume tells us are "original qualities in human nature." (T 1.1.4.6; SBN 13) Kemp Smith therefore holds that Humean doxastic naturalism is sufficient for Humean causal realism.

Winkler 1991: 552-556) John Wright argues that this is to ignore Hume’s reasons for his professed ignorance in the hidden, that is, our inability to make causal inferences a priori. Wright 1983: 92) Alternatively, Blackburn, a self-proclaimed "quasi-realist", argues that the terminology of the distinction is too infrequent to bear the philosophical weight that the realist reading would require. In the realist framework outlined above, doxastic naturalism is a necessary component for a consistent realist picture. There therefore seems to be a tension between accepting Hume’s account of necessary connection as purely epistemic and attributing to Hume the existence of an entity beyond what we can know by investigating our impressions. Kail resists this by pointing out that Hume’s overall attitude strongly suggests that he "assumes the existence of material objects," and that Hume clearly employs the distinction and its terminology in at least one place: T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217-218. (Kail, 2007: 60) There, Hume describes a case in which philosophers develop a notion impossible to clearly and distinctly perceive, that somehow there are properties of objects independent of any perception.

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